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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret

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22 March 1973

	Approved For Release 2004/01/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A024100010002-1	25X1
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SUDAN: Most Arab states are urging President Numari to show clemency toward the eight Black September terrorists he holds.

Numayri has received numerous messages on behalf of the terrorists from Arab governments

The most notable exception reportedly has been Libya. This has encouraged Numayri's suspicion that Qadhafi planned the Khartoum operation, in part to embarrass the Sudanese President. In an interview last week, Numayri referred repeatedly to "another Arab state" as "one of the planners and financiers" of Black September responsible for selecting Khartoum. As a result, several Sudanese suspected of Libyan sympathies have been arrested and others are under investigation.

Meanwhile, Sudan and the fedayeen agreed to halt their propaganda war earlier this week. For public consumption, the Sudanese accepted the Palestinian Liberation Organization's denial of complicity in the murders and Yasir Arafat promised to investigate the affair.

Sudan may have agreed to stop accusing Fatah of being behind the attack if Arafat and other Arab leaders stop pressuring the Sudanese on the terrorists. Whether Numayri also agreed not to execute the terrorists is uncertain. Given his strong belief that Libya was involved, the US Embassy in Khartoum believes that he has made no firm deal with regard to the eight commandos and probably would like to execute at least some of them as a matter of national and personal honor.

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CAMBODIA: Reports that the government is moving against prominent opposition leaders are sure to add to the air of confusion and unrest in Phnom Penh.

Press accounts claim that the regime put Republican Party head Sirik Matak under house arrest yesterday. If Matak is indeed being detained, it is probably because of recent rumors that he has been involved in royalist plotting against the government. These allegations most likely have been circulated by Matak's long-time foe, Brigadier General Lon Non, who is determined to block Matak's appointment to the vice-presidency.

former Demogratic Party chief In Tam was arrested

former Democratic Party chief In Tam was arrested yesterday. In Tam has long been at political odds with Lon Nol, and last summer finished a respectable second in the presidential election. He has been a strong advocate of reconciliation with the Khmer insurgents, and has a wide popular following. But In Tam, like Matak, has no effective political support.

Any official moves against Matak and In Tam would intensify the political tension that has been building in Phnom Penh since last Saturday's violence. They would also make important figures in the government apprehensive about their own positions. This would be especially true of Cambodian Army chief of staff General Fernandez, who ranks high on Lon Non's list of political enemies.

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USSR - WEST GERMANY: The USSR has suggested that party chief Brezhnev pay an official visit to West Germany in May, according to the West German Foreign Office. The precise dates must still be ironed out.

The visit will be the first to West Germany by a top-level Soviet official. To underscore the importance of the occasion, Moscow has indicated that Brezhnev will not stop in East Berlin or in any other European capitals on the trip. The West Germans expect the sojourn to last some five days, and they plan to treat it as a full state visit.

West German officials had earlier speculated that the visit would result in the signature of two and perhaps three agreements: cultural exchanges, scientific-technical exchanges, and--somewhat more problematic--a long-term economic cooperation agreement. The last named would be patterned on the Franco-Soviet model. The Soviets are exploring similar agreements with the Belgians and the Italians.

Any agreements with Bonn will have to surmount or circumvent continuing differences over how to refer to the status of West Berlin. Bonn hopes that by raising this subject at the highest level, the Soviets will show greater flexibility on West Berlin - West German ties. The West Germans probably will complain to Brezhnev about what Bonn regards as Pankow's footdragging on humanitarian and other measures embodied in the inter-German treaty.

Brezhnev and Chancellor Brandt appeared to establish a good rapport when they met in the Crimea in 1971. Their discussions in Bonn are likely to cover European-wide subjects, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, talks on force reductions, and the future course of Brandt's Ostpolitik. Brezhnev may also urge Bonn to move ahead in its talks with Prague on diplomatic recognition. There has been some?

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speculation that the Soviets will allow an increase in the emigration of ethnic Germans from the USSR just prior to the visit. The Soviets undertook such an action on the eve of the Bundestag elections last November.

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NOTE

	CHINA-US: Peking has invited Monsanto to send a defegation to China to discuss the sale of a large petrochemical complex. Negotiations with the Chinese on such major purchases typically require detailed technical discussions and often take as long as two years before a contract is signed. Although China has already purchased almost \$150 million worth of plants from the West this year on mediumterm credits, they could easily afford additional major purchases on similar terms.	/* Z	5X1
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